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COMMENTS
Criminal Law-Abortion-The New North Carolina
Abortion Statute
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1967, the North Carolina General Assembly substantially
amended the state's abortion laws by adopting, essentially intact, the
provisions of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
relating to abortion and kindred offenses.1 Similar enactments recently have been made by the legislatures of Colorado 2 and California.3 By these enactments, all three states have expanded significantly the range of circumstances under which physicians may legally
terminate pregnancies. As set out by the new North Carolina provisions, these circumstances include: (1) the presence of a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the
life or gravely impair the health of the pregnant woman, or (2) the
presence of a substantial risk that the child will be born with grave
physical or mental defects, or (3) the fact that the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. The justifications for abortion outlined
in the Colorado and California amendments are similar.' This com'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967), adopting the essential provisions of the MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 40-2-50, 40-2-51, 40-2-52 (1967).
'CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 99 25950-54 (1967).
'The exact wording of G.S. § 14-45.1 is as follows:
Notwithstanding any of the provisions of G.S. 14-44 and 14-45, it
shall not be unlawful to advise, procure, or cause the miscarriage of a
pregnant woman or an abortion when the same is performed by a doctor
of medicine licensed to practice medicine in North Carolina, if he can
reasonably establish that:
There is substantial risk that continuance of pregnancy would threaten
the life or gravely impair the health of the said woman, or
There is substantial risk that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect, or
The pregnancy resulted from rape or incest and the said alleged rape
was reported to a law-enforcement agency or court official within seven
days after the alleged rape, and
Only after the said woman has given her written consent for said
abortion to be performed, and if the said woman shall be a minor or incompetent as adjudicated by any court of competent jurisdiction then
only after permission is given in writing by the parents, or if married,
her husband, guardian or person or persons standing in loco parentis to
said minor or incompetent, and
Only when the said woman shall have resided in the State of North
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ment will consider briefly the essential provisions of the new North
Carolina amendments.

II.

ABORTION: THE TIMELESS CONTROVERSY

In daring to reform the state's abortion laws, the North Carolina General Assembly ventured into an area fraught with complex
and multi-faceted issues of all types-religious, moral and legal.5
Historically, abortion has provoked quite varied attitudes on the part
of different societies and cultures. It is clear, however, that the significance attached to the subject by Western civilization is primarily a product of inextricably intertwined civil law and canon law
precepts, of relatively recent origin.'
Although any comprehensive examination of the ecclesiastical
and philosophical foundations of the abortion controversy lies outside the scope of this comment, the special position of the Roman
Catholic Church demands mention.7 The only organized opposition
Carolina for a period of four months immediately preceding the operation
being performed except in the case of emergency where the life of the
said woman is in danger, and
Only if the abortion is performed in a hospital licensed by the North
Carolina Medical Care Commission, and
Only after three doctors of medicine not engaged jointly in private
practice, one of whom shall be the person performing the abortion, shall
have examined said woman and certified in writing the circumstances
which they believe to justify the abortion, and
Only when such certificate shall have been submitted before the abortion to the hospital where it is to be performed; provided, however, that
where an emergency exists, and the certificate so states, such certificate
may be submitted within twenty-four hours after the abortion.
The body of literature dealing with abortion is growing rapidly. Those
who wish to familiarize themselves with the general scope of abortion and its

social implications are referred to L. LADER, ABORTION (1966) [hereinafter
cited as LADER]; M. CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES (1958);
P. GERHARD, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND ABORTION (1958); THERAPEUTIC
ABORTION (H. Rosen, ed. 1954); TAUSSIG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED

(1936).

For an excellent study of the ecclesiastical and moral issues

associated with abortion, See G. WILLIAMS,
THE CRIMINAL LAW 146-247 (1957).
'The history of abortion is summarized in

THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND
LADER

75-84, and in G. WIL-

LIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 148-152 (1957).

The Roman Catholic Church's opposition to abortion is grounded historically in the doctrine of original sin, that a child would die without the
sacrament of baptism and thus be condemned to eternal punishment. This
concept is still recognized, but has lost its significance as an anti-abortion
argument. Instead, the Church contends that the embryo is infused with all
aspects of humanity-including a "soul"--from the moment of conception,
so that willful destruction constitutes an intentional homicide of an innocent
person. For an excellent analysis of the Catholic position, see G. WILLIAMS,
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 192-206 (1957).
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to the recent abortion law reforms has been conducted by Catholic
spokesmen; s their efforts stimulated heated public controversies
Public
which delayed reform in both Colorado9 and California.'
uproar was noticeably absent from the North Carolina experience,
however." The lack of fanfare accompanying the North Carolina
reform may be explained in part by one fact: only about one per
cent of the state's population, or about 56,000 persons, is Roman
12
Catholic. (This was, in 1966, the lowest percentage of any state.)
The general inability of Catholic spokesmen to interject theological
issues into the legislative process helped speed passage of the abortion
reforms, and helped limit public debate to the most pragmatic social
and legal considerations. 3

III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Despite the somewhat limited scope of their provisions, the new
abortion statutes of California, Colorado and North Carolina represent important additions to the general state of abortion law in the
United States. Existing law in the vast majority of jurisdictions is
interpreted to prohibit the licensed physician from prescribing or
undertaking termination of a pregnancy to treat a woman's health.
In thirty-eight states it is a criminal offense to procure or attempt
to procure abortion by any means, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life of the woman.' 4 Louisiana, whose statute appears
8
LADER 75, 93, 165; George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and
Movements for Reform, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 371 (1966); Kummer & Levy,
Abortion and the Population Crisis; Therapeutic Abortion and the Law;
Some New Approaches, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 647, 660 (1966).
'See The Denver Post, June 18, 1967, Empire Magazine at 38-45.
" Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition,
13 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 285, 287 (1966).
" See The News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), May 5, 1967, at 1,
col. 1,2.
"General Summary, THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIc DIREcToRY (1967).

" See The News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), May 9, 1967, at 6,
col. 5-8, reporting the general failure of Catholic spokesmen to mount an
attack on the bill.
"'ALAS. STAT. § 11.15.060 (1962); Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-211
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5329 (1958); DEL. CODE ANm. tit. 11, § 301 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§

782.10, 797.01 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1102 (1953); HAWAII Rnv.
LAws §§ 309-3, 309-4 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-601, 18-602 (1948);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105
(1956); IOWA ConE ANN. § 701.1 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-410,
21-437 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. § 436.020 (1962); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 51 (1964) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.204 (1962) ; MINN. STAT. ANN.
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exception,' "

to prohibit all abortions without
effectively places itself
in the majority by prescribing different standards for physicians
than for non-physicians. The physician's license can be suspended
unless he concludes, with concurring medical opinion, that the
woman's life is in peril.16
A few jurisdictions subscribe to one or more of the justifications
outlined in the ALl Model Penal Code. Alabama,1 7 New Mexico I8
and the District of Columbia1 9 expressly provide that abortions
may be performed to preserve the woman's health or protect her from
serious injury. The same result appears to have been reached by the
courts of Massachusetts 20 and New Jersey,"' the statutes of which
prohibit "unlawful" abortions. In Maryland, a doctor may terminate
a pregnancy if, with concurring medical opinion, he believes "that
no other method will secure the safety of the mother. 2 Although
§ 617.18 (1964) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 94-401 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-404, 28-405 (1965); NEV. REV.
STAT. 201.120 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 585:12, 585:13 (1955);

N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 80-81 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (1953); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 861
(1967); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-3-1 (1956); S.C. CODE § 16-82 (1962),
applicable only if the attempted abortion results in death of the woman; S.D.
CODE § 13.3101 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. 8N 39-301, 39-302 (1955); Tnx.
PEN. CODE ANN. arts. 1191-1196 (1961) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1 (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62 (1950);
WAsH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-8 (1966);
Wis. STAT. § 940.04 (1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-77 (1959).
'LA. REV. STAT. § 14:87 (1950).
20
1 7 LA. REV. STAT. § 37:1285(6) (1950).
ALA. CODE tit. 14, 8 9 (1958).
1 8N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A-53 (1953).
19
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1961).
20 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1956) (Whoever "unlawfully
administers to her . . . or . . . unlawfully uses any instrument or other
means . . .").
For the purpose of this case at least, we may assume that, in general,
a physician may lawfully procure the abortion of a patient if in good faith
he believes it to be necessary to save her life or to prevent serious impairment of her health, mental or physical, and if his judgment corresponds with the general opinion of competent practitioners in the community in which he practices.
Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4, 5 (1944); Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675. 171 N.E.2d 850 (1961).
"1N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1953) ("or without lawful justification . . . ."). The law as been held to permit an abortion where necessary to
avoid the death of, or permanent, serious injury to, the woman. State v.
Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 121 A.2d 490 (1956); State v. Brandenburg, 137
N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (1949). See also Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 NJ. 22,
227 A.2d 689 (1967), noted, 46 N.C.L. REV. 205 (1967).
" MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957).
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no cases interpret this statute, an Attorney General of the state has
privately equated "safety" with "health."2
Oregon prohibits all abortions except those necessary to save
the woman's life24 but, like Louisiana, provides more flexible standards for physicians than for non-physicians. Notwithstanding
the restrictive terms of the law, a doctor may protect his license
by obtaining a non-associate physician's opinion that a particular
abortion is necessary to preserve the health of the patient. 25 If
this step is taken, the doctor apparently is immune from criminal
prosecution." Thus Oregon effectively countenances all abortions
grounded on sound medical judgment, while aiming its penal provisions at the unskilled abortionist.
Mississippi, which has adopted none of the medical justifications for abortion, recently amended its statute to include the rapeincest provision suggested by the ALI. Pennsylvania's abortion
statute simply prohibits "unlawful" abortions, but no cases have
interpreted it.28
IV. NORTH CAROLINA LAW PRIOR TO 1967
Prior to the 1967 amendments, North Carolina was aligned with
the majority of jurisdictions, in that G.S. 14-44 prohibited abortion
"unless the same shall be necessary to preserve the life of the
mother."2' 9 However, judicial interpretation limited the purposes
of this statute to the protection of the child en ventre sa mere,30 and
no prosecution could be sustained under it without proof that the
child was "quick." 31 A separate statute, G.S. 14-45, was held to
have as its purpose the protection of the mother rather than the
fetus. 3 2 This provision carried lesser penalties than G.S. 14 -4 4 ,8
23

THERAE"EUTIc ABORTION 152 (H.
21 ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.060 (1953).

Rosen ed. 1954).

"ORE. REv. STAT. § 677.190(2) (1953).
2' State v. Buck, 200 Ore. 87, 262 P.2d 495 (1953).
= MISS. CODE ANN. § 2223 (1966).
For a discussion of the Pennsyl2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4718 (1963).
vania law, see Trout, Therapeutic Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMP.

L.q. 172, 184-86 (1964).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1953).
'0State v. Hoover, 252 N.C. 133, 113 S.E.2d 281 (1960).
State v. Jordon, 227 N.C. 579, 42 S.E.2d 674 (1947).
" State v. Michener, 256 N.C. 620, 124 S.E.2d 831 (1962).
8
Maximum imprisonment five years, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-15 (1953),
as opposed to ten years under the statute protecting the fetus, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-44 (Supp. 1967).
3"
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but the courts applied it throughout the entire term of pregnancy
without regard to quickening.34 Both statutes remain in effect, with
certain changes,3 , to provide basic sanctions against abortion; the
new amendments provide all pertinent exceptions.
V. THiE PRovisioNs OF G.S. 14-45.1

The initial justification for abortion stated by the new law is a
finding, by a licensed physician, that "there is substantial risk that
continuance of pregnancy would threaten the life or gravely impair
the health"3 of the impregnated woman. This language is quite
broad, and at least one authority has severely criticized it for the
"remarkable leeway" it gives to doctors.3 7 But the freedom of
physicians to exercise sound medical judgment in regard to abortion
should hardly be thought "remarkable ;" in no other aspect of medicine does the legislature attempt to prescribe what is good for the
patient.38 Indeed, the release of the practitioner's judgment from the
fear and tension produced by more restrictive laws would appear to
be a positive benefit of the new amendments ;39 the procedural safeguards built into the amendments,40 and administrative sanctions
provided by law41 should be relied upon to protect society from the
corrupt or unthinking doctor.
The medical indications for therapeutic abortion may be divided
into two categories: physical and psychiatric. As a result of advancements in medical science, the strictly physical indications for
abortion have decreased consistently in recent years.42 But whenever
v. Michener, 256 N.C. 620, 124 S.E.2d 831 (1962).
The phrase, "unless the same shall be necessary to preserve the life
of the mother" was deleted from G.S. 14-44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (Supp.
'State

'5

1967).

,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967), note 4, supra.
Quay, Justifiable Abortion--Medical and Legal Foundation, 49 GEo.

L.J. 173, 175-176 (1960).

"8"Even an operation like lobotomy (prefrontal leucotomy), which has
marked effects upon character, is not regulated by law." G. WILLIAMS, THE
SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

223 (1957).

" George, C'irrent Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements for Reform, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 371, 402 (1966).
,5See section VI, infra.
"The State Board of Medical Examiners is accorded express statutory
authority to rescind a practitioner's license when, inter alia, "it shall find that
any physician licensed by it has been guilty of ... producing or attempting

to produce a criminal abortion . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14 (1965).
" LADER 39; Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to
the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 285, 297 (1966); Rosen, Psychiatric
Implications of Abortion: A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, 17 W. REs.
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a physician concludes that the operative facts to justify an abortion
are present, the new amendments aid him by conforming the law
to accepted medical practice. The burden of establishing the upper
limits of the physical justifications for abortion must ultimately be
borne by the medical profession. The new law does not-indeed,
could not--determine whether such justification must be limited
to specific physical effects of pregnancy and childbirth, or whether
it may be expanded to cover other circumstances-such as those in
which the prospective mother is clearly capable of bearing the child,
but will thereafter be rendered incapable of giving it adequate
43

care.

Unlike the recent Colorado 4 and California 4 5 enactments, G.S.
14-45.1 contains no special reference to "mental health." In light
of the steadily increasing psychiatric indications for abortion, 48
however, it seems clear that the General Assembly intended physicians to promote the interests of society and of pregnant woman by
exercising freely sound medical judgment in regard to mental
health. The fact that the General Assembly considered-and defeated-an amendment which would have required one psychiatrist
to be among the three concurring physicians in cases involving the
woman's mental health supports the conclusion that the new law is
L. REv. 435 (1965). Certain severe medical indications, including cancer of
the cervix, severe cardiac disease, severe hypertension, nephritis or kidney
disease, and breast cancer, are still recognized as primary justifications for
abortion. LADER 39. For a comprehensive survey and evaluation of the med-

ical bases of abortion, see Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the
United States, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 403 (1965), and Quay, Justifiable Abortiow-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J. 173, 185-220 (1960).
" Where economic hardship is added to the burden of illness or disease,

it may not cause the immediate death of the patient, but it can certainly
hasten it....

[I]f the physician is convinced that the burden has become

too heavy to endure, it would seem high time that physicians and hospitals cease being cowed by conservative interpretations of the law. Their
responsibility to their profession and their community is care of the total
patient. When socio-economic factors affect her very existence, they must
be included with everything else in a decision concerning abortion.
LADER 40-41.
" CoLo. REv. STAT. § 40-2-50 (4) (a) (i) (Supp. 1967).
"1CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (c) (West 1967). California
would seem to have severely limited the effects of its psychiatric justification
provision by incorporating a definition of "mental health" confined to "the
extent that the woman is dangerous to herself or to the person or property
of others or is in need of supervision or restraint." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25954 (West 1967).

" See Rosen, Psychiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case Study in

Social Hypocrisy, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 435 (1965).
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intended to apply in medical cases of all types.47 The recognized
psychiatric indications for abortion include, but are not limited to,
suicidal tendencies, repeated post-partum psychotic reactions, manicdepressive psychosis and schizophrenia."' As with the physical
justifications, primary responsibility for the proper and ethical application of all psychiatric justifications must rest with the medical
profession. In both types of cases, the new law promotes a balancing
of distinct interests: the continued life or health of the woman, and
continued existence of the fetus. 49 Most state laws (and our own
prior statute) pre-perform this balancing at the general expense of
the woman; now the freedom-and the burden-is the physician's.
The second major justification for abortion under G.S. 14-45.1
is a physician's finding of "a substantial risk that the child would be
born with grave physical or mental defect."' 0 Because termination
of a pregnancy on these grounds requires medical speculation as to
whether the child will in fact be defective, this language constitutes
the most controversial portion of the amendments."' Medical authorities describe several conditions, the occurrence of which during
pregnancy will produce relatively high percentages of birth defects.
These include (1) the ingestion of certain harmful drugs, such as
thalidomide,12 during pregnancy; (2) contraction by the mother of
certain viral infections, especially rubella (German measles); (3)
exposure of the pregnant woman's abdomen to radiation; (4) substantial evidence of certain genetic factors; and (5) sensitization to
the Rh factor.' Of these conditions, rubella poses the most serious
" According to information supplied by the Institute of Government,

Chapel Hill, N. C., this amendment was introduced by State Representative
Jim Beatty of Mecklenburg County, and was defeated by voice vote. Two
reasons for the defeat of the amendment may be suggested: (1) the fact
that all physicians receive some training in psychiatric medicine, and (2) the
general unavailability of psychiatric specialists in the state.
"Rosen, Psychiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case Study in Social
Hypocrisy, 17 W. RES. L. REv. 435 (1965).
" See Leavy and Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; Therapeutic Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 647,
662-664 (1966).
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967), note 4, supra.
"See Quay, Justifiable Abortion--Medical and Legal Foundations, 49
GEo. L.J. 173, 236-241 (1960). The new California abortion omits this
justification for therapeutic abortion, apparently because Governor Reagan
was opposed to it. Comment, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 242, 249 (1967).
" The most famous thalidomide case-in which Mrs. Sherri Finkbine
dramatized the medical, legal and ethical problems associated with U.S.
abortions by obtaining an abortion in Sweden-is reviewed in LADER 10-16.
" Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States, 17 W.
REs. L. REv. 403, 411-413 (1965).
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threat,"' especially if contracted during the first trimester (12
weeks) of pregnancy;' 5 one authority has estimated the chances of
serious deformity to be as high as eighty-five per cent if the disease
is contracted during the first month.56 While it is to be hoped that
rubella may soon be eradicated by an effective vaccine, 7 it and similar
eugenic justifications for abortion have inestimable effects at present. And, while a physician's determination to advise an abortion
for eugenic reasons necessarily invokes certain of the physical or
psychiatric considerations discussed above (since the agony of bearing a defective child may be clearly detrimental to a woman's
health), the interests protected by this provision cannot be disassociated from socio-economic factors." The law allows the pregnant woman to decide, on the basis of her doctor's advice, whether
she shall be relieved of the burden of bearing and caring for a defective child. It is suggested that the freedom to make such choicein the interest of society, the woman herself, and her future children-is a laudable concomitant of life in a democratic society.
Finally, the substantive provisions of the new law permit the
termination of a pregnancy when "[t]he pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest and the said alleged rape was reported to a law enforcement agency or court official within seven days after the alleged rape .... ."59 The humanitarian foundations of this provision
contrast sharply with the primarily medical origins of the sections
discussed previously. Thus, although the eugenic considerations in
incest cases may invoke medical judgments quite similar to those
" Niswander, id., reports that Dr. John L. Sever of the National Institutes of Health has estimated that 30,000 defective children were born following a rubella epidemic which occurred in the United States during 196465. See, also, Quay, Justifiable Abortion--Medical and Legal Foundations,
49 Gno. L.J. 173, 238-241 (1960), and THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 12, 20-21
(H. Rosen ed. 1954).
' "After the twelfth week, there seemed to be no increased risk of congenital malformation." Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United
States, 17 W. Rls. L. Rav. 403, 412 (1965).
58
B. DICKINs, ABORTI N AND THE: LAw 136 (1966).
LADER 38.
"Obviously, the fetal indications for abortion are primarily socioeconomic, since few, if any, actually threaten the life of the pregnant patient;
however, the social as well as economic ramifications of a severely deformed
infant are incalculable." Niswander, Medical Abortion Practicesin the United
States, 17 W. Ras. L. REv. 403, 415 (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967), note 4, supra. This provision
is also incorporated in the Colorado and California statutes. CAL. HALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25951(c)
(West 1967); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 40-2-50
(4) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1967).
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in thalidomide or rubella cases, no medical-psychiatric standards
appear in this portion of the statute. And while it may be argued
that the goal here is to provide a certain narrow type of "protection"
for the mother's physiological and psychological well-being, the primary impetus for the provision clearly is society's feeling that the
rapist's attack is horrible enough without forcing the victim to give
birth to the result of that attack.60
In support of their belief that society does not consider termination of a rape-induced pregnancy to be "a secular anti-social act,"
the drafters of the Model Penal Code cited two pieces of evidence :0
the dearth of reported prosecutions in such cases, and the English
decision in Rex v. Bourne."' The infrequency of American prosecutions growing out of rape-incest cases may be substantiated by
perusal of reports and digests; the Bourne case, as a more positive
piece of evidence, merits a closer look.
In Bourne, a prominent London physician aborted a 14-year-old
girl who had been raped by two soldiers. Although British law provided a penalty as high as life imprisonment for illegal abortion, the
surgeon invited prosecution by performing the operation in a hospital in the presence of the resident obstetrical surgeon. At trial,
Dr. Bourne's testimony attacked the idea that abortions could be
performed lawfully only if they were intended to save life. He
argued that sooner or later the trauma of bearing the child would
wreck the girl's entire life, and that to wait for immediate danger to
her life would be to deny her effective assistance. The jury acquitted Bourne, apparently on the belief that the patient's mental
and physical health would be jeopardized if she were forced to bear
the rapist's child. The Bourne decision has been accepted into British
case law, and broadened somewhat by subsequent decisions of subordinate courts.63
No doubt the attitudes reflected by the Bourne jury are, as suggested by the ALI, widely held today. Public acceptance of the
rape-incest provision, however, cannot alone insure that it can be
and Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; Therapeutic
Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 647, 664
(1966).
"2 ODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
" Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
11 LADER .106; G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL
O Leavy

LAw

163-64 (1957).
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administered without difficulty. This difficulty arises from the fact
that, unlike the new Colorado statutes,' G.S. 14-45.1 makes no
special reference to statutory rape. Thus the statute follows the
Model Penal Code's 1959 draft, which omitted references to
statutory rape because of the drafters' concern that "availability of
legal abortion might encourage illicit intercourse or that exemption
from liability in these circumstances might be misinterpreted as
affirmative approval . . . of a practice strongly discountenanced by
'
The 1962 draft of the Model
substantial groups in our society." 65
Penal Code extends the provision's coverage to statutory rape by
66
including it within the broader term of "felonious intercourse."
One definition of "rape" under North Carolina's basic rape statute
is "carnally knowing and abusing any female child under the age of
twelve years ;"" no proof of force or lack of consent is required. 8
It would seem that, in light of the language and purposes of the
rape-incest provision, pregnancies resulting from offenses of this
type may be terminated. Carnal knowledge of a previously chaste
girl between the ages of twelve and sixteen is a separate statutory
offense, however;69 it would appear that judicial construction or
amendment of the statute is necessary to determine whether impregnated victims of such offense might be eligible for abortions.
Inasmuch as the statute is grounded in the legal concept that chaste
girls in this age group cannot consent to such offense,7" there would
appear to be neither legal nor moral grounds for denying them the
protection granted others. 7
North Carolina's statutory definition of "incest" extends to
sexual relations among parent and child (including stepchildren and
adopted children), grandparent and grandchild, brother and sister
COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-2-50 (4) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1967).
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
"' MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

',N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 14-21 (1953).

See, e.g., State v. Temple, 269 N.C. 57, 152 S.E.2d 206 (1967); State
v. Carter, 265 N.C. 626, 144 S.E.2d 826 (1965) ; State v. Crawford, 260 N.C.
548, 133 S.E.2d 232 (1963).
" N.C.GEN. STAT. § 14-26 (1953).255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961).
o See, e.g., State v. Whittemore,
"'Since one of the requisite elements of the crime under N.C. GE-N. STAT.
§ 14-26 (1953) is the previous chastity of the victim, problems of proof appear certain to arise if the justifications for abortion are held to apply to
such victims. It is submitted, therefore, that any amendment to the statute
should provide any and all special procedures necessary to expedite an adjudication of this element-including discovery, special hearings, and the like.
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(whole or half blood),72 uncle and niece, or aunt and nephew."3
Since the crime has been characterized as purely statutory, 74 any
female of any age who is impregnated as the result of any of the
described sexual relationships would appear to be eligible for an
abortion. Although eugenic considerations may provide grounds for
terminating a pregnancy produced by incest,75 it seems clear that,
as with rape, the affront to public decency engendered by the offense
constitutes the primary justification for abortion in such cases.70
The seven-day reporting requirement for rape cases, though
essentially procedural in character, would appear to have potentially
detrimental effects upon the substantive aspects of this section. This
unique requirement would appear to be grounded in the sound public
policy of requiring substantial evidence of an alleged crime before
an alleged victim may be eligible for an abortion. But it is submitted
that fear or ignorance may cause some victims to fail to meet this
strict time limit, especially where the offense is statutory, even
though substantial evidence of a crime may otherwise be present.
The California and Colorado enactments impose no such time limit,
but instead require district attorneys to handle evidentiary problems
by making certifications of probable cause to officials of the hospital
in which the abortion is to be performed. 7 North Carolina should,
via amendment, adopt a similar provision in order to afford maximum protection to the pregnant victims of sexual crimes.
VI. PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS OF

G.S. 14-45.1

North Carolina's provision for consent by the woman requires

no consent by her husband, or any other person, provided she is
legally competent. It has been argued that abortion should be a
joint burden for the husband and wife, especially if the abortion
is grounded in eugenic considerations."8 This argument fails to
§ 14-178 (1965).
§ 14-179 (1953).
State v. Rogers, 260 N.C. 406, 133 S.E.2d 1 (1963).
Authorities now recognize that incestuous inbreeding merely accentuates

"'N.C. GEN. STAT.

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

the recessive traits of the parents-

whether those traits are good or bad.

225 (1955).
" For a comprehensive survey of the crime of incest, see Hughes, The
Crime of Incest, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 322 (1964).
"' CAL. HEALTHI & SAFETY CODE § 25952 (West 1967) ; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 40-2-50(4) (a) (Supp. 1967). The Model Penal Code also adopts this solution. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(3), (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
"' Comment, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 242, 254 (1967).
WEINBERG, INCESTuous BEHAVIOR
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recognize, however, that (1) the woman is entitled to the primary
protection of the statute because it is she who is primarily subjected
to danger; and (2) there is no sound reason to discriminate between

unmarried and married women in implementing the law. When the
woman is incompetent, the consent requirements under G.S. 14-45.1
are essentially identical to those which the law may require for any
medical operation. 9
The residence requirement of four months set out in G.S. 14-45.1
is apparently intended to prevent the state from becoming an "abortion haven." ' Yet medical authorities have asserted that there is no
physiological time-limit on termination of pregnancy; s ' thus it
would appear that a non-resident might effectively establish residence for the requisite time and then avail herself of the law. Judicial construction or an amendment to the statute would seem to
be in order to clarify the phrase "shall have resided in the State of
North Carolina.. ." so that no woman shall be unnecessarily prejudiced by this language.8 2 It is to be hoped that the significance of this
provision will diminish as other states modernize their abortion
statutes.
In requiring every therapeutic abortion to be certified by three
doctors not engaged in joint practice, and limiting the situs of such
an abortion to an accredited hospital, the General Assembly took
steps which insure maximum safety for the patient. These requirements also further the public interest in objective, uniform appli(3d ed. 1964).
The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
"' See, e.g., Rosen, Psychiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case Study
in Social Hypocrisy, 17 W. Ras. L. REv. 435, 449 (1965). Although neither
the Colorado nor the California statute includes a residence requirement, the
California law does contain a substantive provision prohibiting abortion for
any reason after 20 weeks of pregnancy. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §
25953 (West 1967). This provision appears to expand greatly the legal
protection of the fetus. It has been suggested that the provision was a
necessary political concession calculated to gain the support of those who
oppose the destruction of the fetus in an advanced state of maturity, on religious or moral grounds. Comment, 19 HAsTINGs L.J. 242, 249-50 (1967).
" In a series of recent cases, Federal courts have held that residence requirements imposed upon recipients of public welfare funds are unconstitutional abridgments of the right to interstate travel and the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270
F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967); Green v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 270 F.
Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967). Contra, Harrell v. Board of Comm'rs, 269 F.
Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967). Future developments in this area of the law may
hold significant implications for residence requirements of the type set out
in the North Carolina abortion law.
So

W. PRossER, TORTS § 18, 102
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cation of the new law. Both California and Colorado chose to vest
hospital committees with the responsibility for determining whether
an abortion is required in each individual case;"3 North Carolina's
three-doctor certification would seem to be more flexible, since it
mitigates the pressures experienced by the individual physician, yet
avoids the necessity for complex and time-consuming hospital administrative procedures. The hospital would appear to be protected
adequately by the receipt of the certificate from the doctors before
the operation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

North Carolina's new therapeutic abortion act has been laudedand attacked-as a "liberal" innovation. Viewed in light of the
highly restrictive abortion laws extant in the majority of American
jurisdictions, it undeniably expands the opportunities for legal
abortion. But it is equally clear that no woman can avail herself
of the law's protection in the absence of rather specific evidence,
supported by the opinion of three physicians, that an abortion is
justified. Even the broadest interpretation of the law will not permit
the conclusion that legal abortions may now be had in North Carolina for the sake of mere convenience, or on the basis of a woman's
desire not to bear a child. Trends in social opinion indicate that
future legislatures will have to determine whether abortion should be
condoned for these broad purposes, but the strictly medical orientation of the current law evidences a present intention to approve abortion only in the most crucial circumstances. It would seem that this
narrowness of purpose will cause the new law to have only the most
minimal effects upon criminal abortion; that avenue is still the only
one open to those whose only justification for an abortion is a personal decision not to give birth.
It would further seem that, with minor exceptions, the North
Carolina law has been constructed so as to maximize the potential
for attainment of its relatively narrow goals. Given some future
clarification of the status of statutory rape, and perhaps a reconsideration of the impact of the residence requirement, the statute
would seem to place North Carolina in the vanguard of abortion
reform for some time to come. But it would also seem that, bess CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950 (West 1967); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 40-2-50 (4) (a) (Supp. 1967).

